Pakistan Belongs in Nuclear Suppliers Group
"The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India". US Ambassador Anne Patterson, September 23, 2009Pakistan has the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal today in the midst of a fierce insurgency waged against the Pakistani state by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. How should the world respond? Should the response be to further isolate and sanction Pakistan as argued by some Indian and western scholars? Or, should the US and its Western allies engage with Pakistan by accepting it as a legitimate nuclear state and admitting it as a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group?
TV Paul, a scholar of Indian origin at McGill University, has clearly not worked nor likely to work as explained well by former US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson. The alternative, as advocated in a new book "Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers" by former US diplomat Mark Fitzpatrick, is to recognize Pakistan's legitimacy as a nuclear-armed state and work with it to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation in future.
Ambassador Fitzpatrick began by exploring why the West has been so obsessed with stopping Iran's nuclear program and not Pakistan's. In the end, he came to the conclusion that Pakistan must be provided "a path to normalizing its nuclear program" in the same way that India was with the US-India nuclear deal. Here's how he describes it on the website of London-based Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS):
The book was inspired by fellow Londoner Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times, who asked in a June 2012 column why the West was so obsessed with stopping Iran getting nuclear weapons when, ‘by any sensible measure, Pakistani nukes are much more worrying’. I suppose I was one of those who seemed obsessed with Iran, so Rachman’s words hit home. Let’s take a look at Pakistan, I decided.
Successive chapters of my book examine in detail the dangers Rachman ticked off, plus a few more. I concluded that some of the concerns about Pakistan are exaggerated. While the prospect for nuclear terrorism cannot be dismissed, the government’s efforts to ensure the security of its nuclear programme garner too little attention, and compare favourably with India’s nuclear security management. In the ten years since the leakage of the nation’s nuclear secrets masterminded by A.Q. Khan, lessons have been learnt and reforms adopted.
Other concerns get too little attention. As a nuclear wonk, I cannot help but fixate on Pakistan’s veto over negotiations to ban fissile material production and the nation’s move away from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The most worrisome danger, though, is the prospect for nuclear war in the subcontinent.
One cannot write about Pakistan’s nuclear programme without examining the ways that it is motivated by India’s actions, and perceptions thereof. Therefore, the manuscript is about more than Pakistan. One key chapter assesses the South Asian arms race. Although it pales in comparison with the nuclear excesses of the Cold War, the strategic competition in South Asia is potentially destabilising.
In the conclusions, I offer a policy suggestion for the West that will be controversial. Pakistan, I argue, should be offered a path to normalising its nuclear programme. This recommendation did not sit well with one of the statesmen who, before reading it, had agreed to write a back-cover blurb commending my book. Having vehemently opposed making an exception for India, allowing it to benefit from nuclear cooperation while outside the confines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he had to back out because he objected to the idea of creating a second such hole in the NPT for Pakistan.
His is a respectable opinion. It had also been my view when I started the book project. If there is one tenet I have taken to heart at the IISS, however, it is that analysis should guide one’s research direction. I reached my conclusion with more surprise than enthusiasm.
I am looking forward to explaining more about my analysis in upcoming book launches in Washington, London, Geneva, Vienna and Islamabad.
In spite of the West's nuclear sanctions, Pakistan has managed to develop and build nuclear weapons using both uranium and plutonium since the 1990s. The country also has built solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles of various ranges from tactical to strategic. It has built multiple reactors at Khushab to produce large amounts of plutonium for its growing nuclear arsenal.
On the civilian nuclear side, Pakistan has acquired four 300 MW nuclear plants at Chashma. Two of these are currently operating and two are under construction. Three 1200 MW newer plants are being supplied by China for installation at Karachi as it ramps up its nuclear power plant manufacturing business. The West has essentially given away this civil nuclear business to China on a silver platter.
The West's decades-long nuclear sanctions on Pakistan have clearly not worked to stop the country. It's time to try a different approach along the lines of what Fitzpatrick advocates If the West follows Fitzpatrick's advice and admits Pakistan to the exclusive international nuclear club called "Nuclear Suppliers Group" (NSG), the US and Europe will have a better chance of persuading Pakistan to agree to signing Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when India also agrees to these international treaties. These two treaties are the cornerstone of the West's efforts to limit development, proliferation and growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In return, Pakistan will have access to the West's advanced civil nuclear technology and materials which it needs to deal with the nation's deepening energy crisis. It will be a win-win deal for both sides.
Is Pakistan a Warrior State?
Nuclear Power Plants in Pakistan
"Eating Grass" Book Launch in Silicon Valley
India's "Indigenous" Nukes and Missiles
US-India Nuclear Deal
China Signs Power Plant Deal with Pakistan
Pakistan's Defense Industry
Energy Crisis in Pakistan
BY VAPPALA BALACHANDRAN ON 23/10/2016
Strategists who assumed that India could bring about such a declaration are poor students of history and do not understand how Washington works.
Our “strategists”, who had made the present leadership believe that they would be successful in declaring Pakistan as a terrorist-sponsor nation, are poor students of history. They may be good at event management by organising the prime minister’s diaspora meetings, but they don’t seem to know how Washington works. The closest India came to designating Pakistan as “terrorist nation” was in April 1993, when Narasimha Rao was prime minister. At that time, the Indian embassy and intelligence had jointly made nearly successful efforts to convince the US government of Pakistan’s role in fomenting terrorism against India and also in conniving with the drug mafia. Personal lobbying by ambassadors Abid Hussain and Siddharth Shankar Ray had almost convinced the US State Department to take a stand.
Nawaz Sharif was the prime minister of Pakistan at the time. Buffeted by the then president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sharif sent his confidante, Nisar Ali Khan, to Washington DC to plead his case for “retention”. Khan met then secretary of state Warren Christopher on April 7, 1993. According to the Federal Register, he presented a 5’X 7’ silk rug as a gift to the secretary valued at $500. Although Khan described the talks as “useful”, the state department delivered an unprecedented snub that very evening, warning Pakistan that it would be designated as a “terrorist sponsoring” nation if there was no improvement. Sharif was dismissed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan in July 1993. He moved the Supreme Court General Abdul Waheed Kakar, who was army chief, intervened and made both of them resign.
My personal enquiries at that time with the state department had revealed that it was Benazir Bhutto, on a private visit to Washington DC at the time, who had personally pleaded with the Clinton administration at different levels not to put Pakistan in the company of Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Cuba. Benazir had met even assistant secretary level officers in the state department, setting aside protocol as a former prime minister.
The US 9/11 National Commission has reported another move in 1998 by the state department’s counter-terrorism coordinator to designate Pakistan as a terrorist sponsor due to the ISI’s “activities in support of international terrorism” by supporting attacks “on civilian targets in Kashmir”. This was overruled by then secretary of state Madeleine Albright, who said that “putting the Pakistanis on the terrorist list would eliminate any influence the United States had over them”. Deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott had also felt that “additional sanctions would have bankrupted the Pakistanis, a dangerous move that could have brought ‘total chaos’ to a nuclear-armed country with a significant number of Islamic radicals”. This is the US’s stand even now. They need Pakistan to control Afghanistan. That India can substitute Pakistan in Afghanistan is a pipe dream.
A day after Business Standard reported a new approach in New Delhi strategic circles to India’s use of nuclear weapons (Click here to read the article), the influential Washington D.C. think tank, Carnegie Endowment, discussed the same issue --- the possibility of an Indian “first strike” to defang Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
At the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference on Monday, a prestigious annual event at which important strategic policy chances are often signalled, a discussion took place on whether India was moving away from massive counter-value retaliation (i.e. nuking towns and cities) to counter-force targeting (i.e. nuking enemy nuclear forces and command structures).
Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor, Vipin Narang, outlined a scenario in which a Pakistan-backed terrorist strike on India killed scores of civilians. New Delhi mobilised its three strike corps and attacked Pakistan. With the armour-heavy 21 Corps bludgeoning along, Pakistan ordered a “demonstration” strike with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) --- its short-range Nasr missile batteries --- as a nuclear warning to India. New Delhi’s response, according to traditional Indian nuclear doctrine would then be “massive counter-value retaliation against Pakistani cities, leaving aside how credible or incredible that might be.”
But then Narang sprung the surprise. “There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first. And that India’s opening salvo may not be conventional strikes trying to pick off just Nasr batteries in the theatre, but a full ‘comprehensive counterforce strike’ that attempts to completely disarm Pakistan of its nuclear weapons so that India does not have to engage in… tit-for-tat exchanges and expose its own cities to nuclear destruction.”
Narang pointed out that this dramatic change did not surface from “fringe voices”, but from former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon in his new book; and former chief of India’s strategic forces command, Lieutenant General B S Nagal, both of whom have questioned India’s traditional “massive counter-value retaliation”.
Narang pointed to a possible “decoupling” of Indian nuclear strategy vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. While retaining NFU and massive counter-value retaliation against China, New Delhi was considering a disarming counter-force strike against Pakistan.
Also in question was India’s longstanding “no first use” (NFU) policy, with Narang pointing out that it had been questioned at least four times already. First, India’s official nuclear doctrine, published in 2003, officially eroded the sanctity of NFU by invoking nuclear use against chemical or biological weapons. Second, in November, former defence minister Manohar Parrikar stated (later clarified to be in his personal capacity): “India should not declare whether it has a NFU policy”. Third, General Nagal, in his writings questioned the morality of NFU, asking whether it was possible for India’s leadership to accept huge casualties by restraining its hand well knowing that Pakistan was about to use nuclear weapons.
Fourth, Menon undermines NFU’s sanctity with this paragraph in his book: “There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.”
Said Narang at Carnegie: “Indian leaders can disavow all of this as personal opinions, but when a sitting defence minister, former Strategic Forces commander, and highly respected NSA all question the sanctity of NFU, it all starts to add up.”
China and Pakistan have agreed to cooperate in uranium exploration and mining. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) said it had signed a framework agreement with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission yesterday for technical cooperation in the exploration and development of uranium resources. China signed a similar agreement with Saudi Arabia earlier this year.
Under the new agreement, China's uranium industry will fully employ its technological advantages, its nuclear research institutes, nuclear chemistry industry, aerial remote sensing centre and other units in its cooperation with Pakistan.
CNNC, which said Pakistan is an "important bridge across the Middle East and South Asia", has already exported four 300 MWe reactors to that country and is constructing two 1000 MWe units. It said it is actively engaged in cooperation with Pakistan in uranium resources, nuclear technology applications, the training of workers and other areas.
In March, CNNC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Saudi Geological Survey regarding bilateral cooperation in uranium and thorium resources. Under the agreement, CNNC is to carry out exploration of nine potential areas in the Kingdom within the next two years. In late May, CNNC said it had completed the fieldwork phase and identified several target mineral areas for further investigation.
On 15 July, CNNC's Beijing Research Institute of Chemical Engineering and Metallurgy signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia's King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology to collaborate in research on extracting uranium from seawater. According to that agreement, Saudi and Chinese researchers will conduct a two-year investigation
Pakistan plans to build at least three to four big reactors as it targets nuclear power capacity of 8,800 megawatts (MW) by 2030, the country's atomic energy commission chairman said.
Pakistan has five small reactors in operation with combined capacity of just over 1300 MW. The last one in the four-reactor Chashma plant in Punjab province, built by China National Nuclear Corp (CNNC), went into operation in September this year.
It is also building two Chinese Hualong One reactors with a capacity of 1100 MW each near the port city of Karachi.
Muhammad Naeem, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, told Reuters these two new reactors are now 60 percent and 40 percent complete respectively and should become operational in 2020 and 2021.
Pakistan is now also in the final stages of awarding contracts for an eighth nuclear reactor with 1100 MW capacity which would take the country's total nuclear capacity to about 5,000 MW when it is fini ..
“India and Pakistan are taking advantage of gaps in global non-proliferation regimes and export controls to get what they need,” said Jack Margolin, a C4ADS analyst and co-author of the report.
It is seldom possible to determine whether individual transactions are illegal by using publicly available data, Margolin said, and the report does not suggest that companies mentioned broke national or international laws or regulations.
But past reports by the think tank, whose financial backers include the Carnegie Corporation and the Wyss Foundation, have often led to action by law enforcement agencies.
Pakistan, which is subject to strict international export controls on its programme, has 113 suspected foreign suppliers listed by the United States and Japan. But the C4ADS report found an additional 46, many in shipment hubs like Hong Kong, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.
“In Pakistan’s case, they have a lot more stringent controls, and they get around these by using transnational networks… and exploiting opaque jurisdictions,” Margolin said.
The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, AQ Khan, admitted in 2004 to selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya. He was pardoned a day later by Pakistani authorities, which have refused requests from international investigators to question him.
India has a waiver that allows it to buy nuclear technology from international markets. The Indian government allows inspections of some nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not all of them.
Neither India or Pakistan have signed the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adhered to by most nuclear powers. Consequently, they are not obliged to submit to IAEA oversight over all of their facilities.
C4ADS identified 222 companies that did business with the nuclear facilities in India that had no IAEA oversight. Of these, 86 companies did business with more than one such nuclear facility in India.
“It’s evidence that more needs to be done, and that there needs to be a more sophisticated approach taken to India,” Margolin said. “Just because the product is not explicitly bound for a military facility, that doesn’t mean that the due diligence process ends there.”
India and Pakistan have gone to war three times - twice over the disputed Kashmir region - since they won independence from British colonial rule in 1947.
Having for years secretly developed nuclear weapons capability, the two declared themselves nuclear powers following tit-for-tat atomic tests in 1998.
Book by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, 1994-2001.
Sharing excerpts from the book on his visit to Pakistan to convince Nawaz Sharif against nuclear tests.
Clinton telephoned Sharif, the Pakistani PM, to whet his appetite for the planes, huge amounts of financial aid, and a prize certain to appeal to Sharif—an invitation for him to make an official visit to Washington.
“You can almost hear the guy wringing his hands and sweating,” Clinton said after hanging up.
Still, we had to keep trying. Our best chance was an emergency dose of face-to-face diplomacy. It was decided that I would fly to Pakistan and make the case to Nawaz Sharif.
On arrival in Islamabad, we had about an hour to freshen up at a hotel before our first official meeting, which was with the foreign minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, and the foreign secretary (the senior civil servant in the ministry), Shamshad Ahmad.
When we got to the foreign ministry, we found that the Pakistani civilian leaders had finally figured out how to handle our visit, and the result was a bracing experience. My two hosts rolled their eyes, mumbled imprecations under their breath, and constantly interrupted.
They accused the United States of having turned a blind eye to the BJP’s preparations for the test.
As for the carrots I had brought, the Pakistanis gave me a version of the reaction I had gotten from General Wahid five years earlier.
Offers of Pressler relief and delivery of “those rotting and virtually obsolete air- planes,” said Gohar Ayub, were “shoddy rugs you’ve tried to sell us before.” The Pakistani people, he added, “would mock us if we accepted your offer. They will take to the streets in protest.”
I replied that Pakistanis were more likely to protest if they didn’t have jobs.
Gohar Ayub and Shamshad Ahmad waved the point aside. The two Pakistani officials were dismissive. The current burst of international outrage against India would dissipate rapidly, they predicted.
We set off with police escort, sirens blaring, to General Karamat’s headquarters in Rawalpindi.
Karamat, who was soft-spoken and self-confident, did not waste time on polemics.
He heard us out and acknowledged the validity of at least some of our arguments, especially those concerning the danger that, by testing, Pakistan would land itself, as he put it, “in the doghouse alongside India.”
His govt was still “wrestling” with the question of what to do he said, which sounded like a euphemism for civilian dithering. There was more in the way Karamat talked about his political leadership, a subtle but discernible undertone of long-suffering patience bordering on scorn
For example, he noted pointedly “speculation” that Pakistan was looking for some sort of American security guarantee, presumably a promise that the US would come to Pakistan’s defense if it was attacked by India, in exchange for not testing.
“You may hear such a suggestion later,” Karamat added, perhaps referring to our upcoming meeting with Nawaz Sharif.
I should not take such hints seri- ously, he said, since they reflected the panic of the politicians. Pakistan would look out for its own defense.
What Pakistan needed from the United States was a new, more solid relationship in which there was no “arm- twisting” or “forcing us into corners.”
By stressing this point, Karamat made clear that our arguments against testing did not impress him.
Book by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, 1994-2001.
Sharing excerpts from the book on his visit to Pakistan to convince Nawaz Sharif against nuclear tests.
I shared a car back to Islamabad with Bruce Riedel and Tom Simons to meet Nawaz Sharif.
What we got from the Prime Minister was a Hamlet act, convincing in its own way—that is, I think he was genuinely feeling torn—but rather pathetic.
On this occasion Nawaz Sharif seemed nearly paralyzed with exhaustion, anguish, and fear. He was—literally, just as Clinton had sensed during their phone call—wringing his hands. He had yet to make up his mind, he kept telling us. Left to his own judgment, he would not test.
His position was “awkward.” His government didn’t want to engage in “tit-for-tat exchanges” or “act irresponsibly.” The Indian leaders who had set off the explosion were “madmen” and he didn’t want “madly to follow suit.”
But pressure was “mounting by the hour” from all sides, including from the opposition led by his predecessor and would-be successor, Benazir Bhutto. “I am an elected official, and I cannot ignore popular sentiment.”
Sharif was worried that India would not only get away with what it had done but profit from it as well. When international anger receded, the sanctions would melt away, and the BJP would parlay India’s new status as a declared nuclear weapons state into a permanent seat on UN SC.
I laid out all that we could do for Pakistan, although this time I tried to personalize the list a bit more. Clinton told me 2 days before that he would use Sharif’s visit to Washington and Clinton’s own to Pak to “dramatize” the world’s gratitude if Sharif refrains from testing.
This point aroused the first flicker of interest I’d seen. Nawaz Sharif asked if Clinton would promise to skip India on his trip and come only to Pakistan. There was no way I could promise that.
All I could tell Nawaz Sharif was that Clinton would “recalibrate the length and character” of the stops he made in New Delhi and Islamabad to reflect that Pakistan was in favor with the United States while India was not.
Sharif looked more miserable than ever.
Toward the end of the meeting, Sharif asked everyone but me to wait outside. Shamshad seemed miffed. He glanced nervously over his shoulder as he left.
When we were alone I gave the PM a written note from Secretary Albright urging him to hold firm against those clamoring to test.
The note warned about the economic damage, to say nothing of the military danger, Pakistan faced from an escalating competition with India. Sharif read the note intently, folded the paper, put his head in his hands for a moment, then looked at me with desperation in his eyes.
At issue, he said, was his own survival. “How can I take your advice if I’m out of office?” If he did as we wanted, the next time I came to Islamabad, I'd find myself dealing not with a clean-shaven moderate like himself but with an Islamic fundamentalist “who has a long beard.”
He concluded by reiterating he had not made up his mind about testing. “If a final decision had been reached I'd be in a much calmer state of mind. Believe me when I tell you that my heart is with you. I appreciate & would even privately agree with what you're advising us to do.”
Dispelling the impression that pursuing nuclear technology was a drain on national resources, a top Pakistani nuclear scientist claimed that its peaceful use helped the country to add 1,200 billion rupees ($7.4 billion) to its national exchequer.
Participating in a webinar program to commemorate the 22nd anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear testing organized by Islamabad-based think-tank, the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Ansar Pervez, the former chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, said that the nuclear technology was being used for peaceful purposes in diverse sectors including medicine, health, agriculture, industry, pollution control, water resources management, and safe and sustainable electricity production.
He said that it allowed Pakistan to develop 100 new crop varieties, which added $7.4 billion to the treasury. He further said that 800,000 cancer patients are being treated every year by hospitals using nuclear radiation.
The nuclear program, Pervez said, has not only ensured its national security and regional peace but also helped pursue at least 12 sustainable development goals and promote socio-economic development.
Pakistan is one of only 13 countries across the globe capable of sharing its nuclear knowledge and expertise with other countries for peaceful purposes.
Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament Kamran Akhtar stated that the huge Indian defense acquisitions and developments in the areas of artificial intelligence, cyber security and space militarization are destabilizing for the region. He said the international community must exercise care and caution in sharing its advanced nuclear and other related technologies with India.
“Pakistan can be compared with any developed country in terms of its nuclear expertise, knowledge and capabilities, and is completely qualified to become an active and productive member of the strategic export control regime of the world,” he added.
Naeem Salik, the former director of Strategic Plans Division, said Pakistan became a nuclear weapon state once its security needs were neither understood nor met by the world and its several arms control initiatives were not reciprocated. He said Pakistan has a credible minimum deterrence posture which provides Pakistan security without engaging in a costly arms race with India.
Khalid Rahman, the executive president of IPS, said the unparalleled success of Pakistan’s nuclear program provides a principle to follow in policymaking to address various issues of national significance.
“If we understand this principle and pursue our other national goals with similar zeal, spirit, determination, consistency and unity, then we can effectively meet all other challenges that our nation faces,” he argued.
November 27, 2020
By Sher Bano
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), established in 1956 is the pioneer government agency to oversee the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in the country. It was established to contribute to Pakistan’s overall economic development through the utilization of nuclear energy in various public fields. These include; medical diagnosis/therapy, agricultural production, nuclear energy for power generation, and some other functions that involve peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In the early ’70s, PAEC constructed the first-ever 135 Megawatts (MWs) nuclear power plant at Karachi KANUPP. This was also the first-ever nuclear power generation plant in the developing or underdeveloped world. The successful launch of this power plant later led to the development of four more nuclear plants at Chashma, the CHASNUPP-1, CHASNUPP-2, CHASHNUPP-3, and CHASHNUPP-4. Furthermore, Pakistan also intends to build two nuclear power plants known as K-2 and K-3 at Karachi, one at Chashma, and two at Muzaffargarh. This is part of Pakistan’s long-term plan to produce 40,000 Megawatts MWs of electricity by using nuclear energy by the year 2050. Here it is quite noteworthy to specify that nuclear power generation is believed to be one of the economical and reliable sources of electricity generation. Such credentials have included Pakistan among the list of 30 countries that have fully operational nuclear plants. Along with this, Pakistan is also among the only ten countries in the world that have completed the nuclear fuel cycle.
Likewise, in the field of agriculture, nuclear technology has contributed to various landmark achievements for Pakistan. In this regard, the PAEC has developed multiple facilities for the advancements in the field of agriculture and food in collaboration with the IAEA. It has also launched various programs to increase the nutritional value of staple foods so that it can meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to eliminate malnutrition and hunger. Furthermore, various irradiation techniques have been used in the agriculture sector to enhance the quality of food and to extend the shelf life of products at the farms. Also, PAEC is working on various food fortification initiatives to enhance the vitamin and mineral content in the food and to eradicate malnutrition. This is further evident from the fact that nearly 98 new high-yielding and stress-tolerant crops have been created by using nuclear technology. For the availability of clean water in the country, PAEC for years has been collaborating with IAEA to analyze and detect pollutants in water by using isotopic and nuclear techniques. Pakistan has also built laboratories by collaborating with IAEA for mass breeding of insects that fight pests attacking the crops and thus the use of pesticides is decreased.
In Pakistan, nuclear technology has significant use in the field of medical science especially for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer disease. In this regard, over the years, 18 cancer treatment centers have been developed by PAEC where nearly 0.7 million cancer patients have been treated to date. This counts for almost 80% of the total cancer patients from all over the country. Radiation and various other nuclear techniques are used for treating cancer. Likewise, various cancer awareness campaigns are being run by the PAEC so that cancer gets diagnosed at the early stages. Other than these, PAEC has been collaborating with international organizations like the WHO, IRC, IAEA, and UICC, etc. This has facilitated the access of Pakistani scientists and doctors to the relevant international institutions and provides opportunities for training in the field of nuclear medicines. Taking part in various seminars and workshops also keeps the nuclear medical professionals updated about the latest developments in this field.
Blackwater's Erik Prince said in an interview with Vanity Fair, "If it went bad, we weren't expecting the chief station, the ambassador or anyone to bail us out".
Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad (ATS) has arrested two men with over 7kg of uranium, a highly explosive and radioactive material.
The 7kg of uranium is worth over Rs 21 crore. The accused had even tested the uranium at a private lab for purity. The lab is also under scanner now.
Uranium is a highly explosive material if it goes into the wrong hands and can be extremely deadly. Based on a complaint by an officer from Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Mumbai, an FIR has been filed and further investigations are on. A case has been registered under the Atomic Energy Act.
On February 14, information was received by PI Bhalekar that one person named Jigar Pandya, a resident of Thane was going to illegally sell pieces of uranium.
Subsequently, a trap was arranged by the ATS and Jigar Pandya was apprehended. On inquiry, it revealed that these pieces of uranium were given to him by one Abu Tahir, a resident of Mankhurd.
Instantaneously, Nagpada unit officers and staff reached the Kurla scrap association, Mankhurd in Mumbai and apprehended Abu Tahir.
The uranium was seized and was sent to BARC in Mumbai for analysis. A report was received that the substance is Natural Uranium, which is highly radioactive and dangerous to human life.
September 21, 2021, 2:52 PM IST
By Sunil Sharan in Strategic Insights, India, World, TOI
Much hand-wringing and hair-pulling is going on in India over Pakistan’s “1971” moment. Actually Pakistan has had two 1971 moments. Once when they ejected the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, and now.
The fight then is clear. It is white Christian nations versus brown Muslim nations. The US has been involved in the following campaigns after 9/11: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. All Muslim nations. It has met defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq, and been dealt a bruising blow in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Estimate of Muslim lives lost from war and displacement caused by war since 9/11 vary between five and ten million.
Much is being made of Blinken’s statement that the US would like to see Pakistan evolve the way it, the US, wishes. This is just wishful thinking. When the Americans were all over Afghanistan (and Pakistan), they could not force the Pakistanis to do what they wanted to do. Now that they have hightailed out of Afghanistan, are we expected to believe that the US has more leverage over Pakistan now than before?
Other than the US, the country that has clearly lost out in Afghanistan is India. For 20 years, India has poured over $3 billion in aid and reconstruction into Afghanistan, all of which, in a jiffy, has just landed in the hands of the Taliban. Pakistan has now become without doubt emboldened to launch a second jihad to liberate Kashmir from India. India cannot be naïve and altruistic anymore. It has to ramp up support for Pakistan’s Baloch rebels as well as instigate the Taliban in amalgamating Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province into Afghanistan, a long-cherished dream of its.
India just cannot afford to be a mute and idle spectator in the AfPak region. Its very survival is at risk. Pakistan has often accused India of fomenting terrorism in its own territory through the Pakistani Taliban. But think about this. The Pakistani Taliban wants to impose sharia in Pakistan, just as it’s been now imposed in Afghanistan.
But Pakistan’s Muslims are Hinduized. They don’t want sharia, just as India doesn’t want an enormous territory on its western flank under sharia. It is in India’s interest that Pakistan stays Hinduized. Why then would India support the Pakistani Taliban?
Yet, in many ways, all three countries were hesitant nuclear powers. China did not deploy a missile capable of hitting the American mainland until the 1980s. When India and Pakistan fought a war over Kargil, in the disputed region of Kashmir, in the summer of 1999, India’s air force, tasked with delivering the bombs if needed, was not told what they looked like, how many there were or the targets over which they might have to be dropped.
All that has changed. China has been adding hundreds of new missile silos in recent years. When Pakistan celebrated its 60th birthday in 2007 it had roughly 60 nuclear warheads. Fifteen years on, that number has nearly tripled (see chart). The combined arsenals of China (350 warheads), India (160) and Pakistan (165), though modest by American and Russian standards (several thousand each), now exceed British and French stockpiles in Europe (around 500 in total). All three countries are emulating the American and Russian practice of having a nuclear “triad”: nukes deliverable from land, air and sea. South Asia’s nuclear era is entering a more mature phase.
That need not mean a more dangerous one. A new report by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank in Washington, explores the dynamics among Asia’s three nuclear powers. Since 1998, most Western attention has focused on the risk of a conflagration between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. That danger persists. Yet the risk of an arms race has been exaggerated, argues Mr Tellis, a former State Department official.
India’s arsenal has grown slowly, he observes—it remains smaller than Pakistan’s—and its nuclear posture remains “remarkably conservative”. The comparison with the nuclear behemoths is instructive. America and Russia both maintain huge arsenals designed to enable so-called counterforce strikes—those which pre-emptively target the other side’s nuclear weapons to limit the damage they might do. That means their arsenals must be large, sophisticated and kept on high alert.
In contrast, China, India and Pakistan, despite their manifold differences, all view nukes as “political instruments” rather than “usable tools of war”, argues Mr Tellis. Both China and India, for instance, pledge that they would not use nuclear weapons unless an adversary had used weapons of mass destruction first, a commitment known as “no first use”. America disbelieves China’s promise, much as Pakistan doubts India’s. But the Chinese and Indian arsenals are consistent with the pledges, insists Mr Tellis.
He calculates that if India wanted to use a tactical (or low-yield) nuclear weapon to take out a Pakistani missile on the ground, it would have to do so within a few minutes of the Pakistani launcher leaving its storage site. That is implausible. India does not have missiles that can launch within minutes of an order, nor those accurate to within tens of metres of their target. And, for now, China’s rocketeers also train and operate on the assumption that their forces would be used in retaliation. The result is that things are more stable than the swelling arsenals suggest.
The former foreign minister emphasized the need for internal unity if Pakistan was to ensure meaningful progress in the field of foreign policy
ISLAMABAD: Former foreign minister Mian Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has revealed that China agreed to sign an agreement with Pakistan way back in 2003 in the field of civil nuclear energy before joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while the United States declined to cooperate with Pakistan for the same in the face of AQ Khan affair. The Chinese continued their cooperation and facilitated in establishing many nuclear power plants in Pakistan.
The former foreign minister emphasized the need for internal unity if Pakistan was to ensure meaningful progress in the field of foreign policy.
“In the current state of disunity and lack of direction in Pakistan, no country, friend or foe, knows how or who to deal with in Pakistan. This is a very dangerous situation and cannot be allowed to continue. It is the primary duty of all the stakeholders in Pakistan to bring this to an end.”
Mian Kasuri was addressing a ceremony at the Government College University, Lahore, where he was bestowed with the Lifetime Achievement Award for his contributions in international relations and diplomacy, promoting Pakistan’s relations with major world capitals and neighbours and for his efforts to promote regional peace and connectivity.
The former foreign minister, who served the country from November 2002 to Nov 2007, also disclosed that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had asked Pakistan to continue the dialogue for Kashmir dispute’s resolution under the famous four-point formula that was mooted in his tenure as foreign minister.
He expressed his happiness at the fact that the recent book, ‘In Pursuit of Peace’ by former Indian ambassador to Pakistan and negotiator for backchannel talks during PM Manmohan Singh’s tenure Ambassador S K Lambah, had comprehensively confirmed that what Mian Kasuri had said in his book ‘Neither a Hawk nor a Dove’ published much earlier that Pakistan and India had agreed to resolve all the outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.
Kasuri expressed his pleasant surprise at Lambah’s revelation that Modi asked him to continue the dialogue in 2014 on the same four-point formula. The former foreign minister said that he was aware that because of the negativity engendered by Hindutva supporters under the Modi government, the relationship between the two countries had become exceedingly tense.
PM Modi, Kasuri said, cannot rule India forever. Even at the best of times, he was able to secure about 37% of the total votes with an overwhelming majority voting for parties who are, by and large, opposed to the current policies of the BJP government on Muslims, Kashmir and Pakistan.
“There was no guarantee that Modi would not change his extremist policies, either before or after elections. After all, Modi had paid a surprise visit to Lahore in December 2015 to meet former PM Nawaz Sharif,” Mian Kasuri said.
Besides India, he said, during his tenure, exceptionally close relationship was forged between Pakistan and Bangladesh and he remained in a close personal relationship with his counterpart, Morshed Khan.
He also made sure to cultivate close relationship with PM Khalida Zia and the then opposition leader and current PM, Hasina Wajed.
Similarly, close ties were developed with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives.
Mian Khurshid Kasuri went on to describe the success of the government at that time in establishing close relationship with the US and China, at the same time. A broad-based Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States was formalised, which aimed to promote cooperation in different fields, including economic development, science and technology, education, energy, agriculture, and a regular strategic dialogue.