Saran on India-Pakistan Ties; Gen Mattis in India; Tourism in Pakistan
What does former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran say about ties with Pakistan in his recent book "How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century"? Why have "low-hanging fruit" issues between India and Pakistan like Siachin and Sir Creek not been resolved? Whose fault is it? Who in India torpedoed solutions agreed with Pakistan at the last minute? Why does ancient Indian thinker Kautilya, regarded as the Indian Machiavelli, dominate foreign policy thinking in India with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Why did US Defense Secretary General James Mattis go to India? What was his agenda relative to India's role in Afghanistan and cementing US-India defense ties? Why does Indian security analyst Prof Bharat Karnad say that India "severing relations with TTP will mean India surrendering an active card in Pakistan and a role in Afghanistan as TTP additionally provides access to certain Afghan Taliban factions"? Did Mattis ask India to stop supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorist activities against Pakistan as Karnad anticipated?
Is the US Federal Government response to widespread destruction after Hurricane Maria in US territory of Puerto Rico adequate? Why is the mayor of San Juan so angry? Why is she being attacked by President Trump for demanding faster relief operations? Why did it take more than a week for the US to assign a military general to oversee disaster relief in Puerto Rico? Was President Trump too busy attacking the NFL players taking the knee during the playing of the US national anthem?
How is tourism industry doing in Pakistan? How has the improved security situation and better infrastructure positively impacted tourism in Pakistan? What are latest figures released by WTTC, the World Travel and Tourism Council, for Pakistan? How much does the industry contribute to Pakistan's GDP? What is its potential over the next decade? How does it help promote goodwill for Pakistan?
Viewpoint From Overseas host Misbah Azam discusses these questions with Ali H. Cemendtaur and Riaz Haq (www.riazhaq.com)
https://youtu.be/nzNstymhlnM
Related Links:
Haq's Musings
Kautilya Doctrine Dominates India's Pakistan Policy
India-Pakistan Tensions: Who's at Fault?
Bharat Karnad on Indian Support of TTP Against Pakistan
Pakistan Travel and Tourism Boom
Trump's White House
Talk4Pak Youtube Channel
Is the US Federal Government response to widespread destruction after Hurricane Maria in US territory of Puerto Rico adequate? Why is the mayor of San Juan so angry? Why is she being attacked by President Trump for demanding faster relief operations? Why did it take more than a week for the US to assign a military general to oversee disaster relief in Puerto Rico? Was President Trump too busy attacking the NFL players taking the knee during the playing of the US national anthem?
How is tourism industry doing in Pakistan? How has the improved security situation and better infrastructure positively impacted tourism in Pakistan? What are latest figures released by WTTC, the World Travel and Tourism Council, for Pakistan? How much does the industry contribute to Pakistan's GDP? What is its potential over the next decade? How does it help promote goodwill for Pakistan?
Viewpoint From Overseas host Misbah Azam discusses these questions with Ali H. Cemendtaur and Riaz Haq (www.riazhaq.com)
https://youtu.be/nzNstymhlnM
Related Links:
Haq's Musings
Kautilya Doctrine Dominates India's Pakistan Policy
India-Pakistan Tensions: Who's at Fault?
Bharat Karnad on Indian Support of TTP Against Pakistan
Pakistan Travel and Tourism Boom
Trump's White House
Talk4Pak Youtube Channel
Comments
As President Donald Trump's administration searches for an exit from the war in Afghanistan after over 16 years of U.S. involvement, the United States is making another high-level diplomatic outreach to Pakistan. On Dec. 4, Defense Secretary James Mattis arrived in Islamabad for meetings with Pakistan's top military and civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi and army chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa. In these meetings, Mattis' mission is to convince Pakistani leadership to do more to attack militant safe havens and, in the long term, facilitate peace talks with the Taliban to end America's longest-running war. But Pakistan's leaders won't be easy to convince.
In the discussions, Mattis adopted a conciliatory approach by acknowledging Pakistan's sacrifices in the fight against terrorism, but he also reiterated Washington's demands. The United States has called for Pakistan to take more action against the militants that find refuge on its soil. Among them, crucially, is the leadership of the Taliban operating in Afghanistan.
Diplomatic outreach is just one of the ways the United States is trying to compel a change in Pakistan's behavior. Military aid is another. Last week, the latest report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service showed that the United States would further trim its annual aid package to Pakistan. In 2017, Washington doled out $526 million to Islamabad in exchange for its cooperation, which includes providing overland NATO supply route access through Pakistani territory. In 2018, that number is projected to drop to $345 million.
The United States has gradually trimmed the amount of aid it provides to Pakistan over the last several years. In 2014, for example, U.S. aid to Pakistan amounted to nearly $2.2 billion. For now, it appears that the U.S. strategy is to pursue incremental punitive measures against Pakistan, rather than pursue harsher tactics such as revoking Pakistan's non-NATO major ally status or cutting aid altogether. The United States isn't fully ready to bring out the stick, but the carrot is slowly being drawn back.
Pakistan wants to maintain its relationship with the United States, but it's willing to suffer the cost of deteriorating ties. From Islamabad's perspective, supporting the Taliban follows a rational calculation to ensure post-conflict Afghanistan is friendly to Pakistani interests. Support for Taliban leaders is aimed at denying Pakistan's rival, India, a foothold in Afghanistan. Because of this, Mattis' visit probably won't convince Pakistan to change its behavior, especially considering the Trump administration's calls for India to play a greater economic role in Afghanistan.
https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-accuses-us-exporting-war-instability-south-asia/4168486.html
Pakistan is accusing the United States of "exporting war" and "perpetual instability" in South Asia, and of "speaking Indian language" in bilateral dealings.
The allegations leveled by National Security Adviser Nasir Janjua again underscore the deterioration in Islamabad's relations with Washington. It also strengthened reported suggestions the two countries are on a collision course, particularly since August when President Donald Trump unveiled a new policy for Afghanistan and South Asia.
The U.S. policy accused Pakistan of harboring terrorist groups, including the Haqqani Network, that are fueling the Afghan war and plotting attacks against India. It also focused on using intensified military means to defeat the Afghan Taliban and called on New Delhi to expand its role in Afghanistan, ignoring Islamabad's opposition and objection.
Janjua reiterated Pakistan's objections while addressing a security seminar Monday in Islamabad. He rejected terror allegations against his country, saying the United States was scapegoating Islamabad for failing to stabilize Afghanistan.
"Pakistan made irrelevant in Afghanistan, scapegoating [and] lumping all the blame [on Islamabad], speaking Indian language on every subject, planing to downgrade all ties, U.S. lawmakers are asking to designate Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism," Janjua said.
He went on to complain that despite being a non-NATO ally, Pakistan's attempts to procure U.S. defense equipment have been blocked and its nuclear weapons program is being opposed.
"India has become the preferred ally in Afghanistan and the military solution [for ending the war in Afghanistan] is again given the preference," he noted.
Janjua said the way forward for the United States in Afghanistan is to focus on finding a political solution rather than relying on military might. Washington, he added, should appoint a "political authority" to Afghanistan as empowered as its military commander in the country to promote a political resolution.
Alleging the U.S. wants to contain China's rise and the resurgence of Russia in the region, Janjua said Washington is opposed to Islamabad's multi-billion dollar economic corridor project being funded by Beijing under its global Belt and Road Initiative.
"To mitigate the challenges — China and Russia — and to ensure self-survival, [the] U.S. is exporting war and perpetual instability in South Asia," he said. "India is being supported and encouraged to promote U.S. regional interests. "
US side
There was no immediate reaction from U.S. officials to Janjua's statements.
U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis earlier this month visited Pakistan where he called on civilian and military leaders to redouble their efforts against terrorism. Officials revealed few details of the talks, but described them as positive and productive, dismissing the element of confrontation.
But on Monday, Janjua, who attended the meetings with Mattis, underscored the prevailing mutual disagreements and tensions.
The Trump administration has also warned it may designate certain officials of the Pakistani spy agency, ISI, as global terrorists for their ties to militant groups, including Haqqanis.
Just days before Mattis' visited Islamabad, the CIA director warned if Pakistan failed to act decisively against the Afghan Taliban and Haqqanis, the United States would unilaterally do so.
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/01/15/malam-jabba-hub-of-tourism-in-pakistan/
Known for its scenic beauty, Swat is also called the ‘Switzerland of Pakistan’. While the valley has nearly always remained a major tourist attraction, its local economy mainly depends on tourism.
Located about 300 kilometers from Islamabad and 42 km from Saidu Sharif, Malam Jabba is a complete adventure tourist destination, and perhaps the finest skiing resort in Pakistan.
Malam Jabba has two Buddhist stupas and six monasteries that are spread across the resort. The presence of the monuments at such a height clearly indicates that the area was settled over 2000 years ago. Malam Jabba also offers two exciting trekking trails that offer excellent scenery. The Shangla Top is a trek that is about 18 kilometers from the resort.
In the year 2005, the government started losing its control over the valley and later in 2007 it completely fell to non-state actors. While the government was able to reestablish its writ, no one believed that the charm Swat once had for tourists would ever get restored.
But today, with investors pouring money into the valley’s local tourism, it has once again become a major tourist attraction. While the Pearl Continental Hotel, Malam Jaba is starting its operations in July 2018, a major international skiing competition is also being held on Jan 17 at the Malam Jaba resort that has been rebuilt by the Samson’s Company.
It’s pertinent to mention here that militants had burnt down the PTDC motel – built with Australian collaboration, had destroyed the chairlift cable and an office of the meteorological department in Malam Jabba back in 2008.
Yaqoob, the ski resort’s manager told Pakistan Today that more than one-hundred-thousand tourists come to Malam Jaba every month during winters. Owing to it, the local business has improved, he added.
The manager at the resort further said that the event will not only project a better image of the country but will also help restore the faith of the international community in Pakistan being a safe destination for both the investors and tourists.
While the ongoing projects indicate that the valley is on the right track to development, the initiatives should be encouraged and supported by all stakeholders of the board as any controversy regarding any investment would roll back the efforts which the KP government has made till now, and will leave the people of Swat behind as those who will lose the most.
Syed Raza Hassan
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-architecture/pakistans-crumbling-architectural-heritage-idUSKCN1GD45N
Pakistan (Reuters) - When British colonial rulers hastily left South Asia at Pakistan’s painful birth in 1947, the ensuing chaos and violence meant little attention was paid to the architecture they built or influenced in Pakistan’s biggest city, Karachi.
More than 70 years later, architectural gems have been torn down and many are either crumbling or under threat from real estate developers in Pakistan’s commercial capital which is mushrooming into a mega-city.
The structures, weathered by the salty air, open the door to Karachi’s colonial scars, researchers say, pointing out that many of the original owners were among millions of Muslim and Hindu refugees who fled their homes amid communal and religious violence that accompanied the end of British rule in India in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan.
”Every brick of the heritage building narrates a story of those who left in 1947,“ said Akthar Baloch, a researcher who has written several books on Karachi’s heritage. ”They built them with love and affection.
"When people like me feel bad looking at the neglect of these heritage sites, one wonders how the families of the owners must feel if they ever visit Karachi." (Click reut.rs/2F03sEg for a picture package of Karachi's crumbling heritage buildings)
Karachi’s population has skyrocketed to nearly 17 million people in 2017 from an estimated 400,000 at independence, and every inch of the city has become a valuable commodity for developers building homes or drafting plans to alter the city’s skyline with new skyscrapers.
Jahangir Kothari Parade promenade, once an imposing British heritage site, is now obscured by a maze of overpasses and the shadow of Pakistan’s tallest building.
The promenade is part of a handful of buildings, along with the colonial-era Imperial Customs House, which have been restored to their former grandeur, but such projects are rare when the focus is on tearing down old and building new.
Rapid urbanization has ensured large-scale destruction, particularly in the old city areas, where more profitable multi-story residential buildings have sprung up.
But amid the new concrete, remnants of the colonial legacy can still be seen, often recognizable by their state of neglect.
The Saddar neighborhood of Karachi has perhaps the largest concentration of British architectural history, while in the city’s eastern district, the iconic old colonial jail has been declared a heritage site by Sindh province’s antiquities department.
So far more than 1,700 premises have been listed as heritage sites by the antiquities department and the process continues.
The Sindh Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, introduced in 1994, has helped provide legal protection for structures of historical significance. But courts are also busy with cases of developers trying to circumvent such protection.
March 1, 2018 at 10:18 AM Delete
14 June 2018
Author: Hussain Nadim, University of Sydney
The reality is a lot more complicated than this Eurocentric view of Pakistan’s civil–military relations, which tends to reinforce a perception of Pakistan that serves Western powers and interests. At the core of this Eurocentrism is a tendency to view Pakistan’s civil–military relations through a foreign policy lens, while almost entirely neglecting the domestic political and structural issues at play. Western commentary also tends to treat civilian political leaders as passive actors, overlooking their role in the imbalance.
The civilian and military leadership in Pakistan are on the same page when it comes to foreign and security policies. Disagreements are only over the right methods for achieving these foreign policy goals, and reflect an internal power struggle rather than an ideological difference between civilian and military factions.
For instance, after former prime minister Nawaz Sharif took power at the 2013 elections, he was interested in bold steps to move quickly on peace with India — often even going beyond state protocol and opening backdoor channels. The Pakistan Army was not disinterested in peace with India. Military leaders just wanted to mend relations in a systematic way that would not compromise Pakistan’s interests and that would make peace last beyond rhetoric.
Military leaders advised caution and small steps to achieving sustainable peace with India — advice which Sharif ignored. After several months of futile attempts to court Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who pressed hard on Pakistan after his rise to power, Sharif faced an embarrassing situation. He accepted that his strategy had been a failure and allowed the military to devise a new strategy to engage India.
Civilian and military leaders were similarly split over issues of method when it came to tackling terrorist safe havens inside the country. In 2013, the then new government under Sharif was not interested in launching operations inside the country against the Taliban and other extremist actors. The government instead began peace talks with the terrorist outfits despite repeated advice from the Pakistan Army to the contrary.
The Pakistan army pushed the view that terrorist outfits use ‘peace talks’ as a pretence to regroup, develop credibility and then launch attacks again when the government is vulnerable. Months later, when the terrorists continued their attacks on Pakistan and US forces despite the ongoing negotiations with the Pakistani government, Sharif again was sheepish in front of Pakistan’s security establishment and allowed the military to launch an operation.
When it comes to Pakistan’s current foreign policy posture, there appears to be no rupture in civil–military relations. Both civilian and military leaders support deep ties with China, opening up to Russia, balancing the Middle East, defying the United States and finding a sustainable peace with India and Afghanistan. Even the ‘Dawn leaks’ controversy was less a matter of disagreement over foreign policy than a case of the civilian government trying to embarrass the military establishment.
While civil and military leaders in Pakistan are locked in a power struggle, they are on the same page in terms of foreign and security policy — which is why Pakistan has seen much policy continuity over the past four decades. Civilian leaders pitch this domestic power struggle to international audiences as a matter of ‘foreign policy’ and a ‘fight for democracy’ for the purposes of seeking international endorsements that can be leveraged in the local power tussle.
This absence of nuance in Western academic writing and commentaries on Pakistan is not just a blind spot. It is deliberate neglect whereby the dominant characterisation of Pakistan’s civil–military relations is constructed to suit Western political interests that include aligning Pakistan’s national security policies with that of the West, and having a strong check on its nuclear program.
Alamgir execution touches off a new wave of mutual recrimination between Damascus-based organisation and pro-Soviet regime of President Babrak Karmal.
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/19840815-ties-between-al-zulfikar-and-afghan-president-babrak-karmal-sour-with-alamgir-execution-803216-1984-08-15
In 1979, months after the hanging of Bhutto, Al Zulfikar was organised on the soil of Afghanistan with active patronage from the Afghan authorities, and both Murtaza and Shahnawaz were sheltered in Kabul.
Alamgir, accompanied by Naser Jamal and Arshad Butt, all Karachi boys belonging to Al Zulfikar, hijacked the PIA Boeing on March 2, 1981 from Karachi to Kabul in what has gone down as the longest air piracy in history - nine days - following which the Pakistani authorities had to accede to the hijackers' demand of releasing 52 political prisoners, many of whom were awaiting capital punishment.
Significantly, the hijacking was not condemned by the Afghan authorities at that time even though the prisoners were released by the Pakistani authorities at their own insistence at Damascus and not in Kabul. However, relations between Al Zulfikar and the Kabul Government were getting increasingly sour since 1981 when the Afghans, nettled by Al Zulfiqar's internal squabbles on Afghan soil, began interfering with them in a big way.
Finally, Murtaza and Shahnawaz left their haven in Afghanistan and headed for Libya. The two now operate from Tripoli, the Libyan capital, and Damascus, the capital of Syria, and command a well-trained militia of about 1,500 men. Even Alamgir did not enter Afghanistan for a long time since the hijacking.
He re-entered Afghanistan, according to the Radio Kabul announcement, on March 14 last year, apparently under orders from the Al Zulfikar leadership to liquidate Sinwari, a former Al Zulfikar activist who had adopted Afghan nationality and was suspected of being an Afghan plant in the organisation.
Diplomatic sources in New Delhi said Alamgir was sent from Libya and he might have travelled with false documents. He shot Sinwari dead on March 16 in front of a theatre in Kabul and was arrested by the security police in dramatic circumstances at Kabul Airport the same night, minutes before he was to fly out.
Informed diplomats in Kabul and New Delhi interpret the Afghan action as a determined move by the Afghan Government to strike an anti-terrorist posture and to restore normalcy in its relations with the outside world. The fallout of the 1981 hijack had been costly for the Afghans.
Group of Seven, the powerful member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organisation including the US, Canada, West Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Japan, decided to boycott Afghanistan, thus denying Ariana, the Afghan national carrier landing rights all along the lucrative route of Frankfurt, Paris and London.
The state-controlled Pakistani media prominently displayed the news of Alamgir's execution, thus hinting that Pakistan appreciated the posture of toughness adopted by the Afghans against the assorted followers of the Bhutto family. The Kabul Government also wants direct talks to immediately commence with Pakistan, a desire which can come true only if the latter recognises the Karmal regime.
In dealing strictly with Al Zulfikar, President Karmal has neutralised a major irritant in the way. But, along the Baluchistan front, there are still 5,000 Baluch guerillas garrisoned at the Afghan town of Kandahar, which Pakistan sees as the main stumbling block to normalisation of relations.
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (p. 290). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.
----------------
Ironically, it was a military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, who liberalised the media scene in 2002, allowing private radio and TV channels. Since then, privately owned channels have multiplied. Pakistan now has over 30 Urdu and regional languages news channels, besides entertainment and religious channels. The number of internet users in Pakistan was reported to be around 76 million at the beginning of 2020, an increase of about 17% over the previous year.1 Though around 35% of the total population, this is a significant number in absolute terms. Social media users in Pakistan stood at around 37 million at the beginning of 2020.2 All this has ensured that a large segment of the population is not dependent on the state for information, including about other countries. In this context, access of a large number of people to the internet and social media cannot be overemphasised. As mentioned in Chapter 13, my speech on the Indus Waters Treaty made in Karachi in April 2010 was largely blacked out by the print and electronic media because of a signal from the powers that be, but found its way into the local public discourse through the internet.
.
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (pp. 336-337). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (p. 359). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.
-----------
Absence of dialogue and diplomacy between the two countries carries the risk of an unintended flare-up. With India increasingly convinced of its ability to coerce Pakistan militarily and Pakistan overestimating the leverage resulting from its growing China nexus and the downturn in India-China relations because of China’s aggressive behaviour in eastern Ladakh, an accidental escalation can occur. Restoration of ceasefire on the LoC/IB in the J&K sector in February 2021 was an important step towards shifting to a “management” mode from the free-fall phase of the relationship since 2016. As of this writing, the ceasefire was holding with a few exceptions. However, some additional steps such as upgradation of diplomatic representation to High Commissioners’ level and resumption of trade that would have contributed further to the shift towards a “management” mode, had not come about. The eight-track dialogue format used in every phase of structured dialogue since 1997 has outlived its utility. To begin with, Pakistan never bought wholeheartedly into India’s sagacious rationale that issues such as trade and people to people contacts should not be held hostage to solution of the more intractable political problems. Coming to the specific subjects, it is clear that demilitarisation of Siachen is not possible. without an understanding on the larger J&K issue and vastly improved trust between the two countries. A solution to Sir Creek requires a compromise by both sides, which is not possible until the relationship improves substantially. A roadmap for normalisation of trade, drawn up by the Commerce Secretaries in September 2012, already exists and can be used with suitable adaptation as and when the Pakistani establishment takes an enlightened view on the matter and overcomes the resistance of vested interests in sectors such as pharmaceuticals and automobiles. The revised visa agreement signed in September 2012 is available for implementation as a stepping stone to promotion of greater people to people contacts, but this too can happen only when the overall relationship looks up. As stated in Chapter 10, the Tulbul Navigation Project has become a non-issue.
Sabharwal, Sharat. India’s Pakistan Conundrum (pp. 353-354). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.
https://youtu.be/GNapL0APNUY
In a 30-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire to discuss his book ‘India’s Pakistan Conundrum’, Sharat Sabharwal ( ex Indian Ambassador to Pakistan) identified three preconceived notions that the Indian people must discard. First, he says it’s not in India’s interests to promote the disintegration of Pakistan. “The resulting chaos will not leave India untouched”.
Second, Indians must disabuse themselves of the belief that India has the capacity to inflict a decisive military blow on Pakistan in conventional terms. “The nuclear dimension has made it extremely risky, if not impossible, for India to give a decisive military blow to Pakistan to coerce it into changing its behaviour.”
Third, Indians must disabuse themselves of the belief that they can use trade to punish Pakistan. “Use of trade as an instrument to punish Pakistan is both short-sighted and ineffective because of the relatively small volume of Pakistani exports to India.”
https://youtu.be/GNapL0APNUY
------------
Historically, the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mired in conflicts, war, and lack of trust. Pakistan has continued to loom large on India's horizon despite the growing gap between the two countries. This book examines the nature of the Pakistani state, its internal dynamics, and its impact on India.
The text looks at key issues of the India-Pakistan relationship, appraises a range of India's policy options to address the Pakistan conundrum, and proposes a way forward for India's Pakistan policy. Drawing on the author's experience of two diplomatic stints in Pakistan, including as the High Commissioner of India, the book offers a unique insider's perspective on this critical relationship.
A crucial intervention in diplomatic history and the analysis of India's Pakistan policy, the book will be of as much interest to the general reader as to scholars and researchers of foreign policy, strategic studies, international relations, South Asia studies, diplomacy, and political science.
https://books.telegraph.co.uk/Product/Sharat-Sabharwal/Indias-Pakistan-Conundrum--Managing-a-Complex-Relationship/26726289
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1051609-civil-nuclear-energy-kasuri-says-china-agreed-to-sign-accord-with-pakistan-way-back-in-2003
The former foreign minister, who served the country from November 2002 to Nov 2007, also disclosed that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had asked Pakistan to continue the dialogue for Kashmir dispute’s resolution under the famous four-point formula that was mooted in his tenure as foreign minister.
He expressed his happiness at the fact that the recent book, ‘In Pursuit of Peace’ by former Indian ambassador to Pakistan and negotiator for backchannel talks during PM Manmohan Singh’s tenure Ambassador S K Lambah, had comprehensively confirmed that what Mian Kasuri had said in his book ‘Neither a Hawk nor a Dove’ published much earlier that Pakistan and India had agreed to resolve all the outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.
Kasuri expressed his pleasant surprise at Lambah’s revelation that Modi asked him to continue the dialogue in 2014 on the same four-point formula. The former foreign minister said that he was aware that because of the negativity engendered by Hindutva supporters under the Modi government, the relationship between the two countries had become exceedingly tense.
PM Modi, Kasuri said, cannot rule India forever. Even at the best of times, he was able to secure about 37% of the total votes with an overwhelming majority voting for parties who are, by and large, opposed to the current policies of the BJP government on Muslims, Kashmir and Pakistan.
“There was no guarantee that Modi would not change his extremist policies, either before or after elections. After all, Modi had paid a surprise visit to Lahore in December 2015 to meet former PM Nawaz Sharif,” Mian Kasuri said.
---
Mian Khurshid Kasuri went on to describe the success of the government at that time in establishing close relationship with the US and China, at the same time. A broad-based Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States was formalised, which aimed to promote cooperation in different fields, including economic development, science and technology, education, energy, agriculture, and a regular strategic dialogue.
Pakistan had the largest Fulbright program for sending students to the US. Additionally, he said that the US agreed to not only sell new F-16s, which it had denied to Pakistan for long, but also agreed to upgrade Pakistan’s fleet of F-16s.
In defence matters, cooperation between Pakistan and China has been comprehensive and it involved joint production of advanced weapon systems, including modern and sophisticated JF-17 aircraft, Al-Khalid main battle tanks and F-22P frigates for the navy. Pakistan paid special attention to its relationship with Muslim states and exceptionally close relationships were forged with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE and Iran.
Despite difficulties, there were many high-level visits to and from Afghanistan and trade increased from a mere US$23 million to over US$1.2 billion.
Khurshid Kasuri said that Pakistan forged very close relationships with Britain, France and Germany and despite the fact that Pakistan was a close ally of the US, it vigorously opposed the United States’ proposed attack on Iraq and closely cooperated in this connection with the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Russia.
As a result, the US was unable to get the support of the UN and consequently decided to attack Iraq anyway with the support of the Coalition of the Willing with disastrous consequences for both Iraq and the US.
Mian Kasuri emphasized the need to redress some of Pakistan’s weaknesses, particularly to ensure that there was continuation of policies to ensure economic development. There was also a need for basic agreement between major stakeholders, so that these policies could continue despite change in governments. This could not take place with so much internal disunity.
Project Udbhav to integrate age-old wisdom with modern military pedagogy, the Army says; focus on indigenous military systems, historical and regional texts and kingdoms, thematic and Kautilya studies
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/army-project-to-rediscover-indic-heritage-of-statecraft-from-ancient-texts-develop-indigenous-strategic-vocabulary/article67365776.ece
The Indian Army has started an initiative, named Project Udbhav, to rediscover the “profound Indic heritage of statecraft and strategic thoughts” derived from ancient Indian texts of “statecraft, warcraft, diplomacy and grand strategy” in collaboration with the United Service Institution of India, a defence think-tank.
In connection with this, USI will conduct a Military Heritage Festival on October 21 and 22, to acquaint “future thought leaders with the dynamics of comprehensive national security with special emphasis on India’s strategic culture, military heritage, education, modernisation of security forces and Atmanirbhar Bharat,” according to an Army statement.
Bridging past and present
“The project endeavours to explore India’s rich historical narratives in the realms of statecraft and strategic thoughts. It focuses on a broad spectrum including indigenous military systems, historical texts, regional texts and kingdoms, thematic studies, and intricate Kautilya Studies,” the statement said. As part of this process, a panel on September 29 discussed the “evolution of Indian military systems, war fighting and strategic thought”, exploring both current research in the field and the way forward.
The initiative stands testimony to the Army’s recognition of India’s age-old wisdom in statecraft, strategy, diplomacy, and warfare, the statement said, adding that Project Udbhav seeks to bridge the historical and the contemporary. “The goal is to understand the profound depths of indigenous military systems, their evolution, strategies that have been passed down through the ages, and the strategic thought processes that have governed the land for millennia,” it said.
Indigenous vocabulary
The aim of Project Udbhav is not limited to just rediscovering these narratives, but also to develop an “indigenous strategic vocabulary”, which is deeply rooted in India’s “multifaceted philosophical and cultural tapestry”. The overall aim is to integrate age-old wisdom with modern military pedagogy, it stated.
A study to compile Indian stratagems based on ancient texts has been ongoing since 2021, and a book has been released listing 75 aphorisms selected from ancient texts. “The first scholarly outcome of the initiative is the 2022 publication titled, Paramparik Bhartiya Darshan…Ranniti aur Netriyta ke Shashwat Niyam, meant to be read by all ranks of the Indian Army. English translation of the title being Traditional Indian Philosophy…Eternal Rules of Warfare and Leadership,” the Army said.
The September 29 panel discussion included a dialogue on the study of ancient texts from the 4th century BCE to the 8th century CE, with a focus on Kautilya, Kamandaka, and the Kural. By reintroducing these classical teachings into contemporary military and strategic domains, the Army aims to nurture its officers to apply ancient wisdom in modern scenarios and also allow a more profound understanding of international relations and foreign cultures, the statement added.