Will the Mecca Pact Deter Attacks Against Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey?
Pakistan has historically enjoyed close friendly ties with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. So why did the three nations feel the need to formalize these ties with a mutual defense agreement in Mecca this week? Many answers to this question can all be traced to a fundamental change in the security environment in the Middle East. Foremost among these changes is the extremely reckless behavior of the state of Israel which has had full political, military, economic and diplomatic backing of the West. This unqualified western support began with the Gaza genocide and culminated in the launch of joint US-Israeli assault on Iran in February this year.
The joint Israeli-American aggression against Iran has spiraled into Iranian attacks against the US bases in the Persian Gulf region. Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz, strangling the flow of oil and gas to the rest of the world. It has caused high oil prices, negatively impacting the global economy, Pakistan has stepped in to broker a ceasefire and mediate between the United States and Iran.
While there are many explanations and interpretations of the rationale for the Mecca Pact, there is no question that signing such a mutual defense agreement has been accelerated by the security situation created by Israeli aggression in the Middle East which was fully backed by the United States and other major western nations. It seems that the United States and its western allies have legitimized the principle of "might is right" in the Middle East. Essentially, the law of the jungle has replaced the "rules-based" world order. Hard power now matters more than ever.
In recent years, Pakistan has emerged as a credible military power in terms of both conventional and nuclear capabilities. The Pakistani military's strong performance was recognized in May this year as it responded to what India called its "Operation Sindoor". The country has developed a range of short and medium-range missiles capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Its longest range missile Shaheen 3 can hit deep inside India and Israel. In 2024, the Biden administration imposed sanctions against Pakistan after accusing it of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the US mainland.
Combining the Turkish military-industrial capacity with Saudi economic resources and Pakistan's large military and nuclear umbrella creates a formidable deterrent to any adventurism by Israel or any other hostile power against any of these three countries. That is the fundamental value of the Mecca Pact.
On the global stage, Pakistan has long sought to balance its foreign policy between China and the United States through a pragmatic hedging strategy, gaining economic, military, and diplomatic benefits from both superpowers while maintaining strategic autonomy. But the relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan's ties with China are strategic while those with the United States remain tactical and transactional. What has changed recently is that Pakistan is no longer waging war to help the United States as it did during the "Cold War" and the "War on Terror". Instead, Pakistan has emerged as a peacemaker between the US and Iran.
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https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/9/where-does-iran-stand-on-saudi-pakistan-turkiye-pact
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.
In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.
“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.
Israel alarmed by Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan pact: ‘This alliance is aimed against us’
Israeli official questions claims the Mecca defense pact is focused on Iran and warns Egypt could join; Jerusalem is urged to deepen ties with Greece, Cyprus, India and the UAE as the Sunni axis grows stronger
https://www.ynetnews.com/article/h16pfyvuml
Israel is increasingly concerned that a new defense pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan is directed not only at Iran but also against Israel, a senior Israeli official said Monday, warning that Egypt could eventually join the alliance.
“This agreement troubles us. This is an alliance aimed against Israel,” the official said of the defense agreement signed over the weekend in Mecca.
Reports following the signing suggested Egypt could become the next country to join the emerging bloc.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told the state-run Anadolu news agency that the agreement is effectively modeled on NATO’s Article 5, under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.
Fidan said the alliance would also include a ministerial committee and a general secretariat headquartered in Saudi Arabia.
The senior Israeli official said the agreement reflects a broader regional shift.
“The Shiite axis has weakened, and for a long time we have seen the Sunni axis getting stronger,” the official said. “Israel needs to build alternative alliances, especially with the Hellenic axis, Greece and Cyprus, together with India and the United Arab Emirates.”
Israel, he added, must become “very, very strong” and make other countries dependent on it.
“Israel needs a massive force-building program,” the official said.
The official singled out Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a particular concern.
“The story of Turkey and Erdogan is dangerous,” he said. “We would not be surprised if the Egyptians join the ‘Mecca Alliance.’ This alliance is aimed against Israel. Who do you think they are doing this against? Allow me to be skeptical when they say it is really aimed at Iran.”
The agreement was signed Friday during a meeting in Saudi Arabia between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Dubbed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, the pact is the result of nearly a year of negotiations among the three countries.
‘Unite against Israel’
The signing comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan seek greater strategic independence amid regional upheaval.
Reuters noted that although all three countries remain concerned about Iran and its proxies, they are also increasingly troubled by Israel’s military policies in the region, while doubts are growing over the ability of their longtime ally, the United States, to restrain further escalation.
Pakistan said the agreement also calls for expanding security cooperation across multiple fields.
The alliance brings together three very different powers: Saudi Arabia, a major oil producer; Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state; and Turkey, which has NATO’s second-largest military and a rapidly expanding defense industry.
Turkish media said the pact is likely to lead to joint military exercises and training, as well as increased intelligence and technological cooperation.
Following the agreement, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif directly invoked Israel, calling on the Muslim world to “unite to confront the common threat posed by Israel.”
“Israel poses a threat to all of us,” Asif said. “Islamic countries must adopt a coordinated approach to confront this threat.”
Israel’s Agriculture Minister Avi Dichter:
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. This is a very, very problematic Sunni alliance for the State of Israel.
Egypt will apparently join this alliance as well.
There was an Iran–Iraq–Syria–Lebanon axis, which we cut down, and Syria and Lebanon have left that game. Now we have another alliance.
This requires us to be very, very careful. Pakistan is a country with nuclear weapons, and on this issue we need to remain on guard.
This only strengthens the need for an alliance with a global superpower on the scale of the United States.
https://x.com/clashreport/status/2086826392495292743?s=46&t=Uy6jyUH6DlEyIPi6Mq6AGQ
@bilal_quwa
It's too early to judge the efficacy of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. However, I think there's some real potential -- with some urgency -- in the agreement for one key thing: capacity building across all 3 members.
Basically, none of these 3 powers wants to embroil itself in the security problems of the other.
Pakistan's got some issues that force it to temper its approach with Iran. KSA has commercial interests in India. The Turks vowed back in the early 20th century not to oblige themselves beyond their borders.
However, I don't think any one of these powers is asking the other for active help (i.e., troops, forces, presence, etc.). Rather, I believe each one wants the help of others to build capabilities for their own security.
Pakistan needs fiscal grants and financing mechanisms to support its defence procurement. KSA seeks scalable + dependable supply of munitions, industrial growth, & its power projection. Türkiye wants secure, large-scale markets for its defence industry, collaboration partners for its major programs, and investment.
If each of these countries can build defence capacity, they can defend themselves. In my view, this might be the actual intent of this agreement.
Full analysis in my recent article for @QuwaGroup
https://x.com/bilal_quwa/status/2086924650106302549?s=46&t=Uy6jyUH6DlEyIPi6Mq6AGQ
https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-hopes-for-expansion-of-defense-pact-with-saudis-pakistan-amid-bid-to-woo-egypt/
Turkish president says he aspires that deal, which currently includes Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, will include more countries in region
ISTANBUL, Ankara — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Wednesday he hoped more countries would join a defense agreement signed last week between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that they say is aimed at stabilizing a region wracked by conflict.
The so-called Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on Friday as the Middle East grapples with fallout from the ongoing US-Iran war, which has dragged in regional players and disrupted shipping through the key energy pathways of the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.
“Our vision for it is not limited to the three countries,” the Turkish leader told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat daily. “Rather, we aspire for it to grow, and perhaps appropriate conditions will emerge one day for all countries of the region to gather under its umbrella, he added.
He likely did not mean to include Israel in his reference to the region. Turkish-Israel relations, once close, collapsed after the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and subsequent war in Gaza. Erdogan frequently compares Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, accuses Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, and has consistently offered diplomatic support for Hamas.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on Saturday said Turkey expected Egypt to join the pact “in the next stage,” telling the Anadolu state news agency only “a few technical issues” stood in the way.
Egypt has not commented on the agreement, nor on the remarks by Fidan, who will visit Cairo on Thursday and Friday.
Cairo has robust military cooperation with Ankara, but has given no indication it intends to sign up to the new security alliance, which contains a NATO-style clause saying any attack on one would be seen as an attack on all. Turkey is also a member of NATO.
The five-month US-Iran war, which Washington launched alongside Israel in late February, has upended the security architecture in the region and forced a rethink of decades of conventional wisdom rooted in US military supremacy.
The pact, which consolidates three major US allies into an alternative security architecture that also rejects Israel’s hegemony, seeks to boost security cooperation while also opening the way for “developing joint projects in the defense industries,” Erdogan said.
Along with Turkey, Pakistan has also upped its rhetorical attacks on Israel in recent months, with its defense minister calling Israel “a threat to the entire Muslim world,” and urging a “united military front” against it in Saturday comments.
Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia has grown closer to Turkey, with whom it previously had fraught ties, with Erdogan saying Ankara and Riyadh would “take steps that will elevate relations between the two countries to much higher levels,” without giving further details.
https://youtu.be/plvzSEZXfEU?is=KU1DxiznZvMTLZqK
David Hearst, editor in chief of Middle East Eye, says that after nearly three years of watching Israel wage war across Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Iran, Turkey and the Arab world are finally beginning to build an alternative security order.
Hearst says the turning point came with the new defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. He argues that Donald Trump’s failed war on Iran exposed the limits of the US security umbrella and forced Gulf states to confront a reality they had long avoided, that America could no longer reliably protect them or restrain Israel.
Hearst says that Israel has repeatedly undermined agreements backed by Washington, from Lebanon to Gaza and Iran. He argues that Netanyahu does not want these wars to end, and that neither Biden nor Trump has been willing or able to enforce their own terms on Israel.
For Hearst, the new alliance could eventually strengthen regional negotiators, reduce Israel’s freedom of action and help break what he describes as a century of external domination. He concludes that the real issue is sovereignty, and whether the region’s biggest powers are finally prepared to defend their own land and people together.
https://www.youtube.com/live/xNr2UEBjBPs?is=iczGi0jKiI1VPag4
Is the Mecca defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan a development of considerable consequence or is it simply an extension of earlier arrangements now more formally institutionalized? Is it intended to deter Iran and Israel or does it have a wider focus? What strengths does it confer on Pakistan? What apprehensions does it create in India and Israel? And how will it be viewed by the Trump White House? Those are some of the issues I shall raise today, Thursday the 13th of August, in a live interview at 6.00 p.m. (Washington 8.30 a.m. and London 1.30 p.m.) with a Senior Fellow of the South Asia Programme at the Stimson Center, Daniel Markey.
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/08/13/india-and-pakistan-rivals-with-divergent-views-of-the-global-order/
What do people in India and Pakistan think about major powers?
Indians and Pakistanis generally agree on one thing: Their greatest geopolitical threat is the other. Over half of Indians (54%) name Pakistan as their country’s greatest threat, and 43% of Pakistanis name India. Around one-third of Indian Muslims (34%) name Pakistan as their top threat, compared with 57% of Hindus.
Indians also see China as a top threat (named by 21%). Pakistanis, for their part, see Israel (24%) and the U.S. (24%) as their next-greatest threats.
When asked about their most important ally, Pakistanis clearly point to China (75%) and, to a lesser degree, to Saudi Arabia (12%). About a third of Indians say Russia is their top ally (36%), while 16% name the U.S. Roughly a third of Indians did not answer the question.
Because the U.S., China and Russia play an outsized role in global affairs, the diverging views of these major powers and their leaders is noteworthy.
Indians, for example, show much more positive views of Russia (58% favorable) and President Vladimir Putin (51% confidence) than Pakistanis do (39% and 32%). In fact, Indians are among the most positive toward Russia and Putin across 37 countries surveyed this spring.
When it comes to views of the U.S., Indians feel three times more favorably than Pakistanis. Indians also express more confidence in President Donald Trump.
Pakistanis have overwhelmingly positive opinions of China (90% favorable) and President Xi Jinping (83% confidence). But only around a quarter of Indians express a positive view of China or its president. Indian Muslims are more likely than Indian Hindus to have a positive view of China and confidence in Xi, but on balance, their opinions of both are negative.
Indeed, across 36 countries, the favorability gap between the U.S. and China is largest in Pakistan. India is one of the most comparatively pro-U.S. countries surveyed, and one of only six where people express more positive views of the U.S. than China.
On a variety of questions about the role the U.S. and China play in the world – like reliability as a partner, taking other countries’ interests into account, interfering in other countries’ affairs, and maintaining global peace and stability – a similar pattern holds, with Indians more positive toward the U.S. and Pakistanis far more positive toward China.
Analysis Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan Bloc May Sideline U.S. and Bring Iran Closer to a Diplomatic Deal
By Zvi Bare’l
Middle East News
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2026-08-14/ty-article/.premium/saudi-turkey-pakistan-bloc-may-bring-iran-closer-to-a-diplomatic-deal/0000019f-ff96-d88f-abbf-ff9fa8220000
Whether or not the alliance expands to Egypt, it might prove adept at setting rules for the Gulf, the Red Sea and the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, taking crisis management out of the Americans' hands
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan are trying to create a regional alliance that's not only military but also political and would dictate a regional agenda. But Egypt, the most obvious candidate to join next, remains on the outside. This is no small matter, showing the new alliance's challenges in becoming a broad strategic framework.
Special Edition: How the “Islamic NATO” Shifts Global Geopolitics
https://youtu.be/-Pjezp3GHm4?is=tw-LQdXy6_CIRdQZ
Is last week’s signing of a landmark mutual defense agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan a further signal of global geopolitical realignment?
On this special extended episode of Talking Geopolitics, GPF Chairman George Friedman and Middle East expert and GPF contributor Kamran Bokhari join host Christian Smith for a deep dive into the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement and how it shifts the balance of power across the Middle East and beyond.
Also: GPF Chief Geoeconomist Antonia Colibasanu discusses this month’s Geoeconomic Lens, and the future of sanctions and the war in Ukraine.
Dr. Bokhari is a Senior Resident Fellow with the Middle East Policy Council and a Senior Director at the New Lines Institute for Strategy & Policy in Washington, DC.
Episode recorded on August 11, 2026.
Islamabad has bold ambitions to play a more proactive role in the world
by Alec Russell
https://www.ft.com/content/a9573d72-7bb2-462f-83d7-c0fe36f8c98d?syn-25a6b1a6=1
In the last few decades of the 20th century, the go-to geopolitical board game for many teenagers was Risk. The object was world domination, the secret to success simple. You take over a hinge power on the map that covers the board, try to control a continent and expand from there.
It is like playing the Great Game, as the 19th-century contest for Central Asia was known, around your kitchen table: you keep your armies hidden, and then you strike. Remarkably, the original Risk map with its 42 territories has stayed all but the same since it was launched in 1957.
It is time for an update. Why does the game not include nuclear-armed Pakistan? Its surface area on the Risk board is split between a supersized India, Afghanistan and a vast “Middle East”. Yet in the real-life game of Risk that is geopolitics in Donald Trump’s second term, Pakistan is busily projecting itself as a hinge power.
This month’s defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Turkey is just the latest power play by Islamabad. The most striking was in April when it drew on its ties with America, China and regional powers, and hosted the first direct talks between Washington and Tehran since the Islamic revolution of 1979. There was no breakthrough. Officials fret the impasse made them look silly. Qatar has now in effect assumed their mediating role.
But the signal was clear. Pakistan has tense relations with neighbouring India, Afghanistan and Iran, yet it senses an opportunity to play a more proactive role in the world. It is on paper the ultimate “Ã la carte” middle power, able to pick when to align with Washington and when with Beijing, and able to keep lines open to the Sunni Gulf states and Shia Iran.
BREAKING: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have completely lost trust and faith in the Trump administration and are now united in aggravation with the administration due to the lack of strategy and constant walking back from threats, with some thinking about cancelling the hosting of large US bases, per WaPo.
A Gulf official says "Trump started this war, and we are paying the price," with anger now at its highest point of the entire war.
Gulf states feel "unnecessarily entangled" in a war Trump is "trapped in and unable to resolve," with Trump's Iran policy described as "erratic" and "unpredictable," US "conduct in the region making them less safe, not more safe," and the US-Iran MoU described as "a joke."
Severe US interceptor shortages have compounded the anger, with Gulf states being afraid of Iranian attacks and concerned that the US can't protect them anymore.
https://x.com/hormuzletter/status/2088765053046501466?s=61&t=mgTxrmITUbpo9NntN5677Q
Whistleblower alleges political pressure in antisemitism probes of schools | AP News
https://apnews.com/article/trump-harvard-justice-department-brown-columbia-3e2519fac8b1d85caa74b7ff1ff63744
WASHINGTON (AP) — A Trump administration task force created to combat antisemitismpushed for settlements with Ivy League universities despite government investigations that were rushed and incomplete or that failed to establish legal violations by the schools, a former Justice Department lawyer alleged in a whistleblower disclosure obtained by The Associated Press.
The complaint alleges that the investigations into some of the nation’s most prestigious academic institutions were designed to strong-arm the schools into cutting deals for political purposes. Outcomes of the investigations were “predetermined, without regard to the evidence” in a “politically mandated effort” to extract money from schools through settlement demands and funding freezes under the pretext of rooting out antisemitism, the complaint alleges.
The work of the multi-agency task force, launched by the Justice Department under then-Attorney General Pam Bondi in February 2025, was “marked by extraordinary procedural irregularities, predetermined outcomes without factual or legal support” and disregard for the law and Constitution, lawyers for the former government attorney wrote in seeking watchdog investigations into their client’s complaints.
The complaint taps into a broader public discussion about the administration’s efforts to confront allegations of antisemitism at colleges, a problem that received renewed attentionduring campus protests over Israel’s war in Gaza that some Jewish students said made them feel unsafe. President Donald Trump returned to the White House with a goal of rooting out antisemitism that he said had gone unchecked during the Biden administration, but critics have called his government’s response heavy-handed and said it infringed on free speech rights and coerced concessions from public institutions.
@CFR_Org
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7. Reports indicate that the 3 countries have in essence agreed to a NATO Article 5-like clause—an attack on one signatory would be considered an attack on all of them.
The agreement "reflects a change underway in the Middle East's regional order—one that reduces the United States' decades long leadership role," writes expert @stevenacook.
The U.S.-aligned order could now become a Middle East with two blocs: the countries that remained committed to the Abraham Accords—the 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE—and its alternative, the Mecca Agreement, he argues.
"Previously, regional rivalries and disputes were contained because leaders prioritized their relations with the United States, which was the tie that bound the regional order. Now, with the Pakistanis, Saudis, and Turks moving forward with a vision that competes directly with the Abraham Accords, that no longer seems to be the case," he writes.
Read the full analysis: bit.ly/4gcbsow
https://x.com/cfr_org/status/2089489474518483450?s=46&t=Uy6jyUH6DlEyIPi6Mq6AGQ
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-906316
Mehdi Rahimi, head of the Iranian parliament's Khaneh Mellat news agency, told the channel that "Iran has received an invitation to join the Mecca Agreement, and the matter is under review."
Rahimi added that countries in the region "are moving toward seeking a regional security umbrella," and claimed that this represented "a victory for Iran, because it has been calling for this for a long time."
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Iran has been invited to join the Mecca Agreement for Mutual Defense, the new security alliance established by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan earlier this month, Al Mayadeen reported on Saturday, citing a senior Iranian official.
The invitation has not yet been officially confirmed by Iran's Foreign Ministry or by any of the three countries that are parties to the agreement.
Mehdi Rahimi, head of the Iranian parliament's Khaneh Mellat news agency, told the channel that "Iran has received an invitation to join the Mecca Agreement, and the matter is under review."
Rahimi added that countries in the region "are moving toward seeking a regional security umbrella," and claimed that this represented "a victory for Iran, because it has been calling for this for a long time."
The Mecca Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The agreement establishes a principle of mutual defense under which an attack on any one of the three countries would be considered an attack on all of them. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan compared the mechanism to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, but stressed that the agreement was not directed against Iran or any specific country.
The member states have already begun developing mechanisms for diplomatic and military coordination, including meetings among foreign and defense ministers and military commanders, joint exercises, and cooperation between their defense industries.
Alliance could expand to include more countries
Turkey has said the alliance could expand to include additional countries. Egypt has been publicly mentioned as a possible candidate for membership.
Iran has so far responded to the agreement with cautious approval. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on August 10 that Tehran had "no reason for concern" over the establishment of the alliance.
According to Baghaei, the move reflects growing recognition among countries in the region of the need to build regional security mechanisms.
If the claim that Iran was invited is officially confirmed, Iranian membership would significantly alter the character of the alliance, which was established by three countries with close security ties to the West, and would turn it into a substantially broader regional framework.
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-defence-atmanirbharta/3038146/
One of the issues in the last decade is that the government has not found it possible to provide generous defence budgets, despite the deteriorating security situation.
TN Ninan
Scott Bessent, the US Treasury Secretary, laid out three maxims in a recent speech: “The nation that cannot produce what it needs is not truly secure. The nation that depends on its adversaries for critical inputs is not truly sovereign. And the nation that reduces its economics to consumption is not truly prosperous.”
Bessent’s context is a world that his country more than any other has worked to create — a world in which, as Thucydides wrote, the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must; where alliances can be disregarded, friendships become irrelevant, and markets are subject to unexpected disruptions.
The phrase that characterises this new world is ‘weaponised interdependence’. Such weaponisation comes more easily to those in control of the main nodes of the global economy, giving them coercive power. One could even think of panopticon situations (the usual example being a single guard in a circular prison who can watch all the inmates). Think of the SWIFT interbank communication system. Equally, they could offer choke points for coercive use. Choke points can also be points of vulnerability—think of submarine cables, which, if cut, could cripple an adversary for a while.
For a middle power like India, such a world is more complex and offers many new challenges, and only imperfect answers or solutions. In the spirit of atmanirbharta, can India hope to ensure its security and sovereignty in such a world by producing all that it needs—as Bessent asked? Or not rely on others for critical inputs—something that even the major powers don’t attempt? Think of the major weapons platforms and technologies that are currently imported. Most obviously, what price strategic autonomy when 90 per cent of the country’s oil and half its gas needs are imported? And what price sovereignty in the face of penal tariffs and arbitrary trade sanctions?
It is obvious that the goal in such a world has to be economic efficiency and competitiveness, and must also include the issue of vulnerability and ways to minimise it—without paying too great a price through higher costs that localisation often imposes, affecting competitiveness. Hence the current attempts at domestic chip manufacture and the setting up of data centres. Yet interdependence is written into the scenario and must be dealt with.
The asymmetric conflicts in Ukraine and Iran pose their own urgent questions for the economy. Hundreds of missiles and drones (offensive and defensive) have been fired in a day, for days on end, in both theatres. Can India hope to develop such a supply capability, given its limited manufacturing base, or (as a more sensible alternative) turn civilian industrial units to military use in short order?
Ukraine has also demonstrated the impossibility of territorial gain as an objective, with kill zones effectively freezing the line of conflict. Does that render futile the traditional approaches to armed strength, which eat up much of defence budgets? And Sindoor made clear that wars now are fought in the cyber-physical world. What are the capabilities needed to handle such conflicts? To what extent do we have them?
Self-reliance has its limits
Sensible policies can always provide answers. India could become an electro-state, for instance, by copying China’s example to reduce oil dependence, and multiply storage capacity in order to insulate against supply shocks. China can store more than four months’ oil requirements, whereas India’s strategic reserves are for barely 10 days. When availability can trump price in a critical agricultural input like fertiliser, sensible policy can serve to boost the domestic production of an item that does not, after all, involve rocket science.
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-defence-atmanirbharta/3038146/
India has always been wary of international dependencies. Especially in defence, space and atomic energy, it has sought from the beginning to build national capabilities and to be self-reliant. There are some impressive success stories to show for this in the defence arena: the nuclear-powered submarines, for instance (though Russian help has been critical). Then there is the multi-pronged missile programme. A layered air defence system that showed its mettle during Operation Sindoor. Mobile howitzers for the artillery have been developed by the Armaments R&D Establishment in partnership with Kalyani and Tata. Some aspects of electronic warfare capability constitute another success story.
The risk is that over-reach can result in failure, or unaffordable delays (which in defence is the same thing). Over-reach explains why many attempts at self-reliance in defence have failed, such that the country is the world’s second-largest importer of armaments (next to Ukraine). Major weapons platforms that the country needs are still being imported. On the immediate buy list are 114 Rafale multi-role aircraft from Dassault Aviation for about $28 billion and six conventional submarines from ThyssenKrupp for about $8 billion, while delivery is awaited of 31 heavy-duty, high-altitude MQ-9B drones, ordered with General Atomics for $3.5 billion. These forbidding price tags are for weapons that will be delivered over a few years, but it bears pointing out that India’s total defence capex for this year is just $23 billion. Imported weapons tend to be far more expensive than indigenous substitutes, when these are developed.
Moreover, the world sends periodic reminders about supply vulnerabilities. The gas turbine engines that have powered the navy’s main fighting ships have traditionally come from Ukraine, now consumed by war; fortunately, Bharat Heavy Electricals has been producing gas turbines for the frontline warships. But the supply of the S-400 air defence systems has been interrupted by Russian preoccupations. And Hindustan Aeronautics can’t turn out the 180 Tejas fighters that the air force desperately needs because (among other things) the engines have to come from General Electric, which has delayed production because (again inter alia) a South Korean supplier of components has gone out of business.
Ambition is as ambition does. The import dependence is because too many plans, goals and targets have come unstuck. The dependence on General Electric engines for Tejas is because the domestically developed Kaveri engine didn’t measure up, but the Tejas has had other issues as well, such as with missile firing and radar integration. The army’s demanding specifications for an infantry rifle (such as inter-changeable barrels that use bullets with different sizes!) proved too complicated to deliver, resulting in large-scale imports—but not of guns with inter-changeable barrels. And the NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation) satellite-based system that was to be a regional substitute for the US’ GPS (Global Positioning System) is non-functional because of a shortage of operational satellites and the failure of an atomic clock. This, more than a quarter-century after Kargil 1999 underlined the need for such a system.
Ambition, its costs, and the correction
Indeed, it could be the old cry of a kingdom for a horse, as destroyers have been commissioned without towed-array sonar, and submarines patrol under water without heavy-duty torpedoes. Claims of domestic development have been known to block imports, or international suppliers get blacklisted (bribery being a seemingly inalienable part of the defence industry), so that the navy gets neither imports nor domestically produced substitutes.
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-defence-atmanirbharta/3038146/
The critical need is for realism on what the country can sensibly do on its own (and deliver at cost and within the deadline), while being a part of international consortia where it can’t. As an example of the latter, would India have been better placed if it had stayed as a partner in Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter programme, especially now that China has developed its own stealth fighter, the J-20?
The encouraging development is that policy changes may work to improve on the past record. Targets have been set for increasing the share of domestic supplies in defence hardware acquisitions. The private sector has been invited to get into the armaments business, and foreign investment rules have been liberalised, allowing 74 per cent foreign ownership under the automatic route. Government research laboratories have been encouraged to seek out production partners from the private sector, while funding is on offer for start-ups through the IDEX (Innovators for Defence Excellence) programme, launched in 2018.
The results are noteworthy. Domestic defence production has quadrupled in the last 12 years, to Rs 1.78 trillion, with private output contributing a quarter of the total. Discounted for inflation, production in real terms has probably doubled. Defence exports have grown faster, from next to nothing to Rs 38,300 crore. The ratio of defence exports to imports is now better than it has ever been, at about 1:2, though admittedly estimating imports is difficult since even indigenous manufacturers rely on imported inputs. Still, groups like Tata, Adani, Kalyani, Mahindra, Godrej and Larsen & Toubro have ventured into or increased their focus on defence manufacture, turning out howitzers, drones, missile components, combat vehicles and transport aircraft.
That said, the biggest defence suppliers are still the legacy players in the public sector. That is to be expected, given their long years of experience and established capabilities. So the three Indian companies that feature in the world’s top 100 defence manufacturers are all state-owned: Hindustan Aeronautics, Bharat Electronics and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders. Other government companies remain critical players, like Bharat Dynamics for the missile programme, while Bharat Heavy Electricals makes marine gas turbine engines to replace the old Ukrainian suppliers.
But it’s no longer all government. Larsen & Toubro has invested in an ambitious ship design centre as well as two shipyards. Tata is partnering with Airbus to assemble the C295 transport aircraft. Godrej, meanwhile, is focusing on the demanding task of developing aero-engines. Kalyani is into howitzers. And the navy is funding Kirloskar to make marine diesel engines.
From licensed production to real capability
The critical frontier to cross is progression from licensed manufacture using someone else’s blueprints and critical parts (which translate into limited autonomy) to developing indigenous weapons platforms. HAL has assembled hundreds of Sukhoi fighter aircraft but cannot make one on its own, unlike its Chinese counterparts that moved on from Soviet collaboration to indigenous aircraft development. This is why the Tejas programme has been important, and the fact that HAL is unable to produce the planes ordered by the Air Force has led to a severe shortage of fighter squadrons. This failure may explain why the company has been left out of the shortlist for who will make the advanced medium combat aircraft; three private consortia are in the running. They have no prior experience and will have to depend on international partners. Whether this leads to genuine indigenous capability remains to be seen, especially since significant investment will need to be made in research and development, always a weak point for Indian industry.
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-defence-atmanirbharta/3038146/
Most countries that have built defence industries have done so on the back of a broad industrial base, supported by technological strengths. India is an exception because its manufacturing sector is stunted, and it has strictly limited R&D in just a handful of sectors, almost none of it in the private sector. The share of manufacturing in GDP remains broadly where it was three or four decades ago, and the products are mostly not cutting-edge. The software service companies enjoyed 30 per cent profit margins but still did not invest in artificial intelligence that now threatens their core business.
The attempt to build sophisticated defence manufacturing units despite the broader manufacturing and technological limitations is therefore unique, and beset with challenges. Mazagon had to wait until the Steel Authority of India was able to make the high-strength steel needed for submarine pressure hulls, as also the hulls for capital warships. Limited budgets also mean that project lead times are long, and often a product is obsolete by the time it is ready. And in defence, unlike in the civilian world, there is no room for the second-best, nor is there room for waiting when a war breaks out. Over and above the inadequacies, the crucial skill that seems to be missing is effective project management that focuses on what is doable, what needs to be bought out, and the ability to call a halt to something that is not working so that more resources are not wasted.
One of the issues in the last decade is that the government has not found it possible to provide more generous defence budgets, despite the deteriorating security situation. Given India’s manifest shortage of fighter aircraft and its ageing submarine fleet, senior service officers talk of a more challenging military balance with both Pakistan and China. Yet India’s defence spending is just 2.1 per cent of GDP, when the global average is 2.5 per cent, and security experts have said India’s should be 3 per cent. The difficulty is that defence already accounts for a fifth of non-interest government expenditure. There is nothing that helps defence budgets more than a rapidly growing economy.
Yet, budget limitations may not be as much of a constraint in the future as they have been so far, given the asymmetric David-Goliath scenarios in the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia, and Iran and the US. Most importantly, can India afford to invest less in expensive platform weapons, and focus on cheaper missiles and drones that are cost-efficient counters to those expensive platforms—and manufacture them in large enough numbers? If drones are re-defining modern warfare, is an imbalance in the numbers of tank regiments or frontline warships less of a decisive factor in a conflict?
The drone question
The difficulty is that drones come with their own questions. India has ordered the expensive MQ-9B Reaper drones from General Atomics, but the US lost no fewer than 45 of them (costing about Rs 1000 crore each) in its war with Iran. The government has recently ordered 840 kamikaze drones from Tata and the Pune-based Nibe, but how immune are they to jamming, or to defensive strikes? It may boil down to firing attack drones (including long-range ones) in sufficiently large numbers so that at least some get through defensive walls. In turn, the critical defensive abilities will be to jam incoming drones’ navigation systems and to neutralise them before they strike. It is essentially a technology game in a rapidly developing field, and smartness can trump budgets.
Does that mean India needs to worry less about Chinese tanks massed across the Line of Actual Control in Aksai Chin, or fret less about China deploying its new stealth fighters, or not pay much attention to the strengthening of the Pakistan navy? Intuitively, the answer is that the country should continue to build its conventional defence capabilities.